February 1st, 2026 | Nathan Daniel

An Official, Global Alliance Of Separatist Movements

Let's make it happen.

Separatist movements are no longer fringe disruptions to the international system. They are recurring, structural features of modern governance. Alberta, Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia are not historical accidents or emotional rebellions. They are the predictable result of centralized states struggling to manage divergent economies, political cultures, and democratic expectations within a single legal framework. Yet each movement is forced to operate in isolation, treated as a domestic nuisance rather than as part of a broader global pattern. This fragmentation is strategically irrational. A formal international alliance of separatist states would correct that failure by pooling legitimacy, expertise, and leverage in a system designed to resist internal exit.

The modern international order is built to preserve existing borders. Institutions like the United Nations, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization are structured around sovereign states that already exist. They offer no neutral or coherent pathway for regions that seek statehood through democratic means. Instead, separatist movements are left to negotiate alone with parent states that control constitutional rules, fiscal flows, and international recognition. The imbalance is obvious. A coordinated alliance would not guarantee independence, but it would dramatically improve the strategic position of movements that already command significant public support and institutional capacity.

Consider Alberta. Its separatist sentiment is rooted less in identity than in political economy. Alberta’s export-driven resource sector funds federal programs while federal policy increasingly constrains that same sector. Equalization, environmental regulation, and central banking decisions are experienced as external controls rather than collective choices. Whether or not separation is desirable, the grievance is coherent. Alberta is structurally misaligned with the political centre that governs it.

Quebec presents a different case. Its nationalism is older, more institutionalized, and linguistically grounded. It has held two referendums and maintains a dense ecosystem of nationalist parties, civil society groups, and policy institutions. Quebec demonstrates that separatism can be stable, procedural, and democratic without descending into crisis. It also shows the limits of unilateral action. Despite decades of organization, Quebec still lacks any formal international allies willing to advocate for its right to statehood.

Scotland and Catalonia offer parallel European examples. Scotland’s independence movement operates within a mature democratic system yet remains constrained by constitutional veto from Westminster. Catalonia’s attempt to force the issue revealed how quickly liberal democracies abandon procedural neutrality when territorial integrity is at stake. Catalan leaders were prosecuted, exiled, and delegitimized despite commanding millions of votes. The European Union responded not by mediating but by deferring entirely to the Spanish state.

These cases are not aberrations. They reflect a consistent pattern. The international system treats separatism as a contagion rather than as a governance problem. This creates perverse incentives. Central governments harden their positions. Separatist movements radicalize or stall. Economic uncertainty deepens. Democratic legitimacy erodes.

An Official International Organization

An alliance of separatist states would not be a protest club or a symbolic caucus. It would function as an institutional counterweight to the existing state-centric order. Its core purpose would be coordination. That coordination would operate across four main domains: legal strategy, economic planning, diplomatic engagement, and information infrastructure.

Membership would include regions with sustained democratic mandates for increased autonomy or independence. Beyond Alberta, Quebec, Scotland, and Catalonia, likely participants include Flanders in Belgium, which consistently supports greater sovereignty within a deeply divided federal state. South Tyrol in Italy, which maintains extensive autonomy but faces structural limits imposed by Rome. The Faroe Islands and Greenland, both of which already operate as quasi-states within the Danish realm. Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, which voted overwhelmingly for independence in a recognized referendum. New Caledonia, whose repeated votes for independence reflect a long-term trajectory rather than a settled outcome. Kurdistan in Iraq, which functions as a de facto state constrained by regional geopolitics rather than internal legitimacy.

Some movements would remain observers rather than full members. Texas and California have visible but unstable independence movements. Corsica and Sardinia lack consistent electoral mandates. Hong Kong’s autonomy struggle is constrained by geopolitical realities that make formal participation unlikely. The alliance would need clear thresholds to avoid dilution or capture.

Structurally, the organization would resemble a hybrid of a policy consortium and a diplomatic bloc. It would have a permanent secretariat responsible for research, legal analysis, and intergovernmental coordination. It would maintain a legal advisory council composed of constitutional scholars, international law experts, and former judges tasked with developing standardized frameworks for referendums, negotiations, and transitional governance. This alone would be transformative. Most separatist movements reinvent legal arguments from scratch under hostile conditions. Shared doctrine would reduce uncertainty and increase credibility.

Economically, the alliance would function as a planning forum rather than a substitute market. Members would coordinate on currency transition models, debt apportionment strategies, trade continuity agreements, and central bank options. One of the greatest fears surrounding independence is economic rupture. Parent states exploit this fear by threatening exclusion from markets, capital flight, or institutional collapse. Coordinated planning neutralizes much of that leverage. When models are shared, stress-tested, and publicly vetted, fear loses its force.

Diplomatically, the alliance would operate as a collective voice in international forums. While it would not initially be recognized as a treaty organization, it could maintain liaison offices in major capitals and multilateral institutions. Its objective would be normalization. Separatism would be framed not as rebellion but as constitutional reconfiguration. The alliance would publish regular reports on democratic legitimacy, fiscal viability, and public opinion trends across member regions. These documents would serve as reference points for journalists, investors, and foreign governments that currently rely almost exclusively on parent state narratives.

Information coordination is equally critical. Separatist movements routinely lose battles not because of weak arguments, but because of asymmetric messaging. Central governments control national broadcasters, diplomatic channels, and regulatory language. A media and data office could centralize polling standards, economic forecasts, and legal updates. Consistency builds trust. It also prevents movements from undermining one another through contradictory claims.

Critics And Reality

Critics may argue that such an alliance would destabilize the international system. The opposite is more likely. Suppressing legitimate separatist movements creates volatility. It pushes disputes into courts, streets, and constitutional crises. A structured alliance channels those pressures into predictable, transparent processes. It professionalizes exit rather than romanticizing it.

Others will claim that separatist movements are too diverse to cooperate. That objection misunderstands the goal. The alliance would not impose ideology or strategy. It would standardize process. Alberta and Catalonia do not need to agree on culture or policy. They need shared tools to navigate negotiations with entrenched states that already cooperate extensively with one another.

There is also the question of legality. International law is ambiguous on secession by design. It privileges stability over clarity. But ambiguity is not neutrality. It advantages existing states. An alliance that invests in sustained legal scholarship and strategic litigation can gradually shape norms. Kosovo’s recognition, South Sudan’s accession, and East Timor’s independence all demonstrate that international law evolves under pressure. That pressure is more effective when organized.

Canada, in particular, should understand this logic. The Supreme Court of Canada’s opinion on Quebec secession acknowledged that democratic legitimacy creates obligations even in the absence of a clear legal pathway. That reasoning is rarely applied elsewhere. A global alliance could operationalize it by defining what constitutes a clear mandate, good faith negotiation, and proportional response.

None of this guarantees independence. Separation is not always inherently virtuous. It is a governance choice with costs and risks. But the current system ensures that those costs are inflated by uncertainty and political obstruction. An alliance reduces friction. It allows voters to assess independence based on evidence rather than fear.

The deeper issue is institutional realism. The nation-state is not disappearing, but it is fragmenting. Economic specialization, regional identity, and democratic expectations increasingly operate below the level of legacy borders. Ignoring that reality does not preserve stability. It delays adjustment. An alliance of separatist states would not dismantle the international order. It would update it.

Separatist movements already exist. They already command millions of votes. They already shape elections and policy. Treating them as isolated domestic anomalies is no longer credible. Coordination is the rational next step. The only alternative is perpetual constitutional standoff.